

BONN ECON NEWS

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Redaktion: Dorte Huth, Wirtschaftspolitische Abteilung
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Nr. 353

Montag, 04.06.2012

VERANSTALTUNGEN DIESER WOCHE / ACTIVITIES OF THIS WEEK

Dienstag, 05.06.2012

IZA Forschungsseminar
12.00 Uhr, IZA Schaumburg-Lippe Str. 9

Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, Universität Frankfurt
“Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women:
A Cross-Country Analysis”

LawEcon Workshop
18.00 Uhr, Juridicum, Raum 055

no seminar

Mittwoch, 06.06.2012

Macro/Econometrics/Finance Workshop
12.15 Uhr, Lennéstr. 35, AG-Raum, 1. Etage

no seminar

Micro Workshop BGSE
12.15 Uhr, Juridicum, Raum 055

Rafael Aigner, BGSE
“Investing Your Vote - The Emergence of Small
Parties”

BGSE Brown Bag Seminar
14.15 Uhr, Fakultätszimmer

Ralph Lütticke, Lien Pham, BGSE
“Household income risk, nominal frictions and
incomplete markets”

Micro Theory Seminar
16.15 Uhr, Fakultätszimmer

Tilman Börgers, University of Michigan
“Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant
Strategy Voting Rules”

Donnerstag, 07.06.2012

Finance and Insurance Seminar
12.00 Uhr, Juridicum, Sitzungszimmer der
Fakultät

no seminar

IZA Brown Bag Seminar
12.00 Uhr, IZA, Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 5

Feast of Corpus Christi

Macro/Econometrics/Finance Seminar
16.15 Uhr, Juridicum, Raum 055

IZA FORSCHUNGSSEMINAR

Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt

“Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: A Cross-Country Analysis”

Abstract

We document contemporaneous differences in the labor supply of married women across 13 OECD countries, and find that they are substantial, amounting to 540 hours between the maximum and the minimum observations in our sample. We build a simple model of married females' labor supply in order to analyze which factors drive these differences. Four inputs into the model vary internationally, namely male and female wages, as well as consumption taxes and labor income taxes. Regarding the latter, we use detailed non-linear tax codes of the respective countries as an input. We find that the model is able to explain a large part of the observed differences in married females' labor supply between the US and Central Europe or Scandinavia, respectively, but cannot explain the low labor supply of married women in Southern Europe. A decomposition analysis underlines the importance of taxation. We further analyze the role of differences in average tax rates vs. differences in the marginal tax rate schedules, and investigate the effects of joint taxation of married couples.

MICRO WORKSHOP BGSE

Rafael Aigner, BGSE

“Investing Your Vote - The Emergence of Small Parties”

Abstract

Proportional election systems normally feature an election threshold. Parties with vote shares below the threshold do not enter parliament. Nevertheless, these parties often do get votes. We analyse this phenomena in a two-period model with aggregate uncertainty about whether or not some newly emerged party has sufficient support to pass the threshold. In equilibrium, passionate supporters of the new party vote for the party despite an expectation that the party will fail the threshold. Their vote signals a strong backing in the population and fosters the party's chances to enter parliament at the next election.

MICRO THEORY SEMINAR**Tilman Börgers**, University of Michigan

“Robust Mechanism Design and Dominant Strategy Voting Rules”

Abstract

We develop an analysis of voting rules that is robust in the sense that we do not make any assumption regarding voters' knowledge about each other. In dominant strategy voting rules, voters' behavior can be predicted uniquely without making any such assumption. However, on full domains, the only dominant strategy voting rules are random dictatorships. We show that the designer of a voting rule can achieve Pareto improvements over random dictatorship by choosing rules in which voters' behavior can depend on their beliefs. The Pareto improvement is achieved for all possible beliefs. The mechanism that we use to demonstrate this result is simple and intuitive, and the Pareto improvement result extends to all equilibria of the mechanism that satisfy a mild refinement. We also show that the result only holds for voters' interim expected utilities, not for their ex post expected utilities.

**Redaktionsschluß für
“BONN ECON NEWS” Nr. 354
MITTWOCH, 06.06.2012
12.00 Uhr**

BONN ECON NEWS by email* (pdf)

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