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- Info
Papers of 2000
- Abbink, Klaus: Fair Salaries and the Moral Costs of Corruption, (No. 1/2000)
- Fachat, Christian: Agency Costs, Net Worth, and the Transmission Mechanism of Monetary Policy, (No. 2/2000)
- Fachat, Christian: Agency Costs, Net Worth, and the Credit Channel of Monetary Transmission, (No. 3/2000)
- Krelle, Wilhelm: Problems of Transition from a Planned to a Market Economy, (No. 4/2000)
- Dieter Bös and Martin Kolmar: Self-Correcting Mechanisms in Public Procurement: Why Award and Contract Should be Separated, (No. 5/2000)
- Huck, Steffen and Normann, Hans-Theo and Oechssler, Jörg: Through Trial & Error to Collusion - The Discrete Case, (No. 6/2000)
- Oechssler, Jörg and Riedel, Frank: On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models, (No. 7/2000)
- Martin Barbie, Ashok Kaul and Marcus Hagedorn: Dynamic Efficiency and Pareto Optimality in a Stochastic OLG Model with Production and Social Security (No. 8/2000)
- Florian Höppner and Katrin Wesche: Non-linear Effects of Fiscal Policy in Germany: A Markov-Switching Approach (No. 9/2000)
- Dieter Bös and Martin Kolmar: Anarchy, Efficiency, and Redistribution (No. 10/2000)
- Jörg Oechssler and Burkhard Schipper: Can You Guess the Game You're Playing? (No. 11/2000)
- Andreas Roider: On the Foundations of the Property Rights Theory of the Firm: Cooperative Investments and Message-Dependent Contracts (No. 12/2000)
- Thomas Gaube: Group size and free riding when private and public goods are gross substitutes (No. 13/2000)
- Thomas Gaube: Income taxation and production efficiency in a simple two-sector economy (No. 14/2000)
- Urs Schweizer: An Elementary Approach to the Hold-Up Problem with Renegotiation (No. 15/2000)
- Reinhard Selten, Axel Ostmann: Imitation Equilibrium (No. 16/2000)
- Matthias Kräkel: Delegation and Strategic Compensation in Tournaments (No. 17/2000)
- Anke S. Kessler: Representative versus Direct Democracy: The Role of Informational Asymmetries (No. 18/2000)
- Anke S. Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, Patrick Schmitz: Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals (No. 19/2000)
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